# International Taxation

3rd part: Transfer prices

Prof. Dr. Gerrit Frotscher
International Tax Institute
University of Hamburg
Associate Prof. Stepan Lyubavskiy, Unecon

#### **Significance**

- About 50 % of import and export of goods are between group companies
- Therefore huge potential for profit transfers
- In practice, however, limited:
  - ☐ Interference with responsibility of profit centres
  - ☐ Can lead to wrong management decisions
  - ☐ High risk due to tax audits
  - Risk of (economic) double taxation

### **Applicable Law**

- National law:
  - ☐ Hidden profit distribution
- International:
  - □ Art. 9 OECD-MA □ arm's length principle
  - legal basis in contracting state necessary
  - □ If an adjustment is made by one state the other state has to make a corresponding adjustment □ but only if the first adjustment was in line with Art. 9 OECD-MA (arm's length principle), what may be disputed by the other state
- All legal rules follow the arm's-length-principle
- Business transactions between affiliated companies have to be structured as between third parties

### Basics of arm's-length-principle

- Partly fictitious, since transactions between affiliated companies follow other rules than those between third parties (e.g.: group backing)
- Direct comparison with third party behaviour rarely possible
- Therefore "notional" comparison ("what would a third party have done if…"
- Functional analysis
  - What function is fulfilled by what company?
  - ☐ Functions eg:

**Production** 

Sales

Research/ownership of intangibles

storage

Appropriate reward for functions and risks

#### **Methods**

- OECD-report 2010
  - Standard methods
  - Profit-oriented methods
  - Global methods
- National Guidelines, eg Germany:
  - ☐ Administrative principles 1983
  - ☐ Administrative principles Cost Contribution Agreements (1999)
  - ☐ Administrative principles Expatriates (2001)
  - ☐ Administrative principles Procedures (2005)
  - Regulation re. documentation

### Internationally used methods:

- Standard methods
  - ☐ Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP)
  - □ Cost-plus method
  - Resale price method
- Profit-oriented methods
  - ☐ Profit-split method
  - ☐ Transactional net margin method (TNMM)
- Global method
- Germany: Standard methods and TNMM; Russia: only standard methods
- USA allows global methods, Brazil uses lump-sum standards

#### Standard methods

- Comparable uncontrolled price method
  - ☐ Direct application of arm's-length-principle
  - Comparison with transactions between third parties, between taxpayer and a third party or between affiliate of taxpayer and a third party
  - ☐ Intra-group deals are not "comparable" because not "uncontrolled"
  - ☐ State-controlled prices are not "uncontrolled"
  - ☐ Requires knowledge of all details of the transaction (volume, quality, freight, risk of losses, currency, payment terms, guaranties etc)
  - ☐ Full knowledge of details of third-party transaction in practice not available
  - ☐ Risk that fiscal authorities use "better knowledge of hindsight"

#### Standard methods

- Cost-plus-method
  - Remuneration for producer are costs plus (limited) profit element
  - Applicable for processing agreements, turn-key contracts, professional services
  - Apart from this hardly in line with arm's-length-principle
  - □ Problem: What are "costs" (eg different depreciation regimes)? □ generally accepted accounting standards
  - ☐ Full costs or only variable costs?

#### Standard methods

- Resale-minus method
  - Remuneration for Marketing company are costs plus (limited) profit element
  - Market risk is borne by producer
  - Applicable, if marketing company has the role of a mere agent/ commissionaire
  - Not applicable, if marketing company bears full market risk/fulfills full functions of a trader
  - □ Not freely exchangeable with cost-plus-method

#### **Profit-oriented methods**

- Profit-split method
  - ☐ Profit of a transaction is split between seller and buyer
- Transactional net margin method TNMM
  - ☐ Comparison of the net margin of a transaction between affiliated companies with a margin of a third-party-transaction
  - Frequently used
  - ☐ Data banks for margin analysis available
- Wrong conclusions possible if cost level of the partners differs substantially (overheads, inefficiencies)
  - Correctness of this method depends on the issue what factors are included in "margin"
  - ☐ If data banks are used, knowledge required how data are computed

#### Global methods

- Total profit of a group of companies is allocated to local companies according to a key
  - ☐ eg return on investment/capital
  - ☐ eg margin as percentage of proceeds
- Global methods are not in line with arm's-length-principle, therefore not in line with Art. 9 OECD-MA
- Are used by USA

### Price range

- Special problem if price range exists:
- Average of the prices within the range?
  - ☐ Argument: If the tax payer acts in line with the market the agreed prices will in medium/long run equal the average of the market prices
- Prices of second and third quartile?
  - Argument: Prices in the first and fourth quartile are likely to be special cases and therefore not "comparable"
- The price most favourable for the tax payer?
  - Argument: Every price in the price range is a market price and therefore a "comparable" price

#### Transfer of goods

- Comparable uncontrolled price method
- Relevant selling market
- Marketing company as risk taker or agent?
- Losses of a marketing company?
- Change of marketing structure "transfer of functions"
  - ☐ Transfer of customer relationships
  - Transfer of profit potential
  - ☐ See part 4 "Transfer of Functions"

#### **Services**

- Comparable prices rarely available (e.g. transport, insurance)
- Other areas: cost plus method
- Group coordination costs
  - ☐ Use of group name (not if trade mark)
  - ☐ Development of group strategy
  - ☐ Administration of associated companies
  - ☐ Corporate governance (internal audit?)
  - □ Appraisal
  - Benefit test

#### **Control- and Coordination Centres**

- Neither permanent establishment of parent nor of affiliated company (no transfer of mind and management)
- Costs can be charged if the services are of benefit for the affiliated company
- Cost-plus method incl. market-related profit element

#### Intangible assets

- OECD-report distinguishes:
  - Marketing intangibles (trade marks, customer relationships)
  - ☐ Trade intangibles (patents, production processes
- Uncontrolled price method
  - ☐ Cost-plus not appropriate
  - Resale-minus not possible
  - ☐ German fiscal authorities maintain card index for royalties
- Separate company for patent administration
  - □ Toll research
  - □ Risk taker
  - Problem: How to transfer intangible assets to the patent administration company?

### **Financing**

- Market interests
  - ☐ Currency
  - □ Relevant market
  - Securities
  - ☐ Financing period
- Thin capitalisation (Germany):
   Interest expenses are only deductible to the amount of interest income plus 30 % of EBITDA; excess carried forward
- Thin capitalisation (Russia):
  - Applicable if non-resident legal entity holds more than 20 % of resident company; equity-debt ration 1:3 (banks and leasing companies: 1:12,5). Excess reclassified as dicvidends

#### **Documentation**

- Internationally widely used by fiscal authorities
- In principle: Tax payer has to explain what he has done and why; fiscal authorities have the burden of proof
- Documentation requirements
  - Documentation of facts: Type and clauses of transactions
  - Documentation that the arm's-length-principle was complied with
- Issues:
  - Has the documentation to be done immediately after the event?
  - Under what circumstances can the fiscal authorities ask for the documentation?
  - Has the documentation to be handed over immediately after the request of tax authorities

### **Documentation/Sanctions – Example Germany**

- If documentation is not available or not useable:
  - Assumption that due to transfer prices profits have been reduced (change of burden of proof), and
  - ☐ In case of a price range: use of the most unfavourable price, and
  - ☐ Surcharge of 5-10 % of additional income
- In case of late handover: 100 € per day, up to a maximum of 1 Mio € (per year, per transaction, per request?)

#### Mutual agreement procedure:

- Legal basis: Art. 25 OECD-MA
- Request has to be put forward within 3 years after the measure resulting in a double taxation
- Inefficient because:
  - Initiation of the process at the discretion of authorities
  - □ Tax payer is not involved
  - ☐ Risk that authorities come to a solution at the cost of the tax payer
  - □ Takes long times
  - ☐ Possibility to agree to disagree
- DTA US-Germany: Arbitration with "first best offer"

#### **Arbitration procedure:**

- Legal basis: EC-convention
- 3 steps:
  - Information
  - Mutual Agreement Procedure: 2 years
  - ☐ Arbitration procedure: 6 months
  - ☐ Fiscal authorities can accept the arbitration decision or agree within 6 month to another solution
- Arbitration has the character of a legal procedure
- Tax payer is party to the process
- A solution has to be found which avoids double taxation

#### **Rulings:**

- In OECD-states possible, however costly
- Advanced Pricing Agreements (APA)
  - Agreement with the fiscal authorities that a certain method to calculate transfer prices is valid
  - ☐ Can be with more than one fiscal authority (multi-party APA)
- Valid only if actual prices are calculated in accordance with APA
  - □ APA can lead to additional taxes if not followed: If APA was correct, all other methods are not suitable for the specific case □ therefore fiscal challenge
- Risks:
  - Content of ruling can be worse than hoped
  - ☐ Fiscal authorities are put on the alert
  - Premature information of fiscal authorities

### **Controlled Foreign Companies** (CFC):

- Avoidance of profit transfers to companies with reduced functions
- 4 Steps:
  - Companies without economic function: abuse of law
  - ☐ Management in Germany: unrestricted taxation
  - ☐ Company with reduced function in a low-tax area: CFC rules apply
  - ☐ Company with full function: transfer prices
- Transfer pricing rules would be sufficient

### CFC's/ legal consequences - Germany:

- CFC must be controlled by German residents
- Passive income as defined by law
- Resident in low-tax-country: tax rate less than 25 %
- Income of CFC is allocated to shareholder as deemed dividend
- Foreign taxes of the CFC can be deducted or credited
- Tax exemption/reduction of tax base available for "normal" dividends is not applied to "deemed dividend" of CFC
- However, dividend later actually paid by the CFC is tax-exempt.

#### Russia:

 No CFC regulation, however currency regulations restricting domestic investors in respect of investments outside Russia have a similar effect.

### ECJ dated 12/9/06 (Cadbury-Schweppes)

- Establishment in another state with the aim at using the beneficial tax system is protected by the freedom of establishment
- Discrimination since profits of a UK based affiliate are not taxed at the level of the parent company
- Only possible justification is prevention of abuse of law
- Establishment of an affiliate in a low tax country is no abuse of law
- However, company must carry out actual and true business activities
  - ☐ Can be business relationships to affiliated companies

#### **ECJ on CFC rules:**

- Criteria for abuse of law:
  - ☐ Material presence
  - Deliveries/performances on own account
  - Activities with added value
- Standardised assumptions possible
- Taxpayer must have the right to prove the contrary
- German CFC-rules to a large extent not in line with EC law, therefore limited application if CFC is located in EC country

#### Transfer of business functions

- Transfer of assets
  - Material assets
  - ☐ Immaterial assets
  - ☐ Customer relationships
  - ☐ Good will
- Transfer of "transfer package"
  - Profit potential
  - ☐ Who has the right to tax profit achieved in a low tax/low cost country?