Ludwig Wittgenstein

Dissatisfied with earlier attempts by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) attempted to elucidate the nature of logical truth in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). Wittgenstein was concerned with the relation between language and the world and the logical and mathematical ramifications of this relation (Bunnin and Yu 739, Blackburn 390). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein asserted that in order to describe reality, logic is necessary, but not sufficient and, in so doing, put forth what has come to be known as the picture theory of meaning (Rohmann 430). In his picture theory of meaning, Wittgenstein argued that language mirrors reality. However, Wittgenstein was not concerned with ontology, per se. He believed that the language used in this sort of metaphysical inquiry simply mirrored the logical structure of its subject matter, making the inquiry itself unnecessary by virtue of the impossibility of its very nature (Hunnings 2-3). Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning succeeded in explaining the possibility of falsehood, but ultimately broke down due to its reliance on the atomic propositions it posited, which proved to be untenable.

ABOUT HIS THEORY.
The picture theory of language, also known as the picture theory of meaning, is a theory of linguistic reference and meaning articulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. ... Picture theory of language states that statements are meaningful if they can be defined or pictured in the real world.
In Wittgenstein’s early thinking — from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus era — he conceived of the world in terms of facts rather than objects. Objects are simple: a ‘red ball’ is an object that has the property of ‘redness’ and an assortment of properties that are associated with ‘ball-ness’. Facts, by contrast, are states of affairs that involve relationships between objects. e.g.:

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