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- 2. What is a conditional? A conditional is two propositions related by some “if...then...” construction. “If it
- 3. What is a conditional? A conditional is two propositions related by some “if...then...” construction. “If it
- 4. What is a conditional? “If it is Monday, then I have class.” M: it is Monday
- 5. What is a conditional? “If it is Monday, then I have class.” M: it is Monday
- 6. A big project in philosophy is to give a correct account of the semantics of conditionals.
- 7. today we’ll talk about standard ways to understand the semantics of conditionals the material conditional the
- 8. material conditional In most introductory logic classes, you’re taught that the “material conditional”, which I’ll indicate
- 9. quick note... The “truth-value” of a proposition or sentence just means whether the sentence is true
- 10. “If it is Monday, then I have class.” M: it is Monday H: I have class
- 11. In general, a material conditional of the form “A ? B” will be false if and
- 12. “If it is Monday, then I have class.” M ? B T T T F T
- 13. M ? B T T T F T T T F F F T F The
- 14. M ? B T T T F T T T F F F T F When
- 15. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 16. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 17. “It is not the case that, if there is a God, then the moon is made
- 18. proof “It is not the case that, if there is a God, then the moon is
- 19. proof ~(G ? C) G 1. ~(G ? C) assumption 2. ~(~G v C) 1, implication
- 20. Or here’s another strange inference: Imagine that a light will go on if and only if
- 22. Then we can say “the light will go on if and only if both the left
- 23. Then we can say “the light will go on if and only if both the left
- 24. L: Left switch is up R: Right switch is up O: Light is on
- 25. “the light will go on if and only if both the left switch is up and
- 26. (L & R) ?? O (L ? O) v (R ? O) (L & R) ??
- 27. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 28. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 29. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 30. (a) “If Moscow is in New Zealand, then 2 + 2 = 4” (b) “If Moscow
- 31. but this is a bit weird...
- 32. (a) “If Moscow is in New Zealand, then 2 + 2 = 4” (b) “If Moscow
- 33. (c) “If Moscow is in New Zealand, then Red Square is in New Zealand” Moreover, it
- 34. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 35. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 36. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 37. (d) “If I were living in Paris, then I would try to learn French.” This conditional
- 38. (d) “If I were living in Paris, then I would try to learn French.” This creates
- 39. (d) “If I were living in Paris, then I would try to learn French.” First, can
- 40. (d) “If I were living in Paris, then I would try to learn French.” Second, the
- 41. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 42. three problems with the material conditional the material conditional generates some inferences that seem wrong the
- 43. the strict conditional Before looking at the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactusl, I want to say a
- 44. C.I. Lewis
- 45. quick modal logic lesson L means “necessarily” and M means “possibly” (A box is often used
- 46. quick modal logic lesson What do “necessarily” and “possibly” mean? There are different types of necessity/possibility.
- 47. quick modal logic lesson “Possibly, I could jump high enough to land on the moon.” If
- 48. quick modal logic lesson When people talk about “possible worlds,” they generally mean worlds where the
- 49. quick modal logic lesson On the other hand, there is no possible world at which “2
- 50. Lewis was unhappy with the material conditional. He said we should interpret conditionals as claims about
- 51. For Lewis, “If A, then B” is true if and only if L(A?B) is true We
- 52. the strict conditional One very nice feature of treating conditional statements as “strict” in this sense
- 53. For instance, the following is invalid when the “if...then” part is read as “strict”: ~(If there
- 54. ~(If there is a God, then the moon is made of cheese) There is a God
- 55. In case you’re interested, here’s a quick illustration of why the argument’s invalid, using the tableaux
- 56. ~[L(G?C)] Assumption ~G negated conclusion ~[L(~G v C)] 1, implication M~(~G v C) 3, ~L rule
- 57. Unfortunately, the strict conditional has problems too. These are called the “paradoxes” of strict implication.
- 58. paradoxes of strict implication If B is necessarily true, then L(A ? B) will be true.
- 59. If B is necessarily true, then L(A ? B) will be true. Why is this weird?
- 60. If B is necessarily true, then L(A ? B) will be true. Why is this weird?
- 61. That means... (e) “If Moscow is in Russian, then 7 is a prime number.” (f) “If
- 62. paradoxes of strict implication If B is necessarily true, then L(A ? B) will be true.
- 63. So then these sentences turn out true: (g) “If 2 + 2 = 5, then Moscow
- 64. That’s enough of strict conditionals. Now we’re going to move on to the semantics for counterfactuals/subjunctives
- 65. indicative vs. subjunctive (i) “If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did.” (indicative) (j) “If
- 66. One way to think about the difference is that an indicative conditional attempts to describe the
- 67. Generally, indicatives have antecedents with verbs in the simple present or simple past and no modal
- 68. Generally, indicatives have antecedents with verbs in the simple present or simple past and no modal
- 69. In contrast, subjunctives have verbs in the past perfect or the word “were” and a modal
- 70. In contrast, subjunctives have verbs in the past perfect or the word “were” and a modal
- 71. For the purposes of this discussion, we’ll say a counterfactual is a subjunctive conditional with a
- 72. Note, not all subjunctive conditionals have a false antecedent: (k) “If Jones had taken the arsenic,
- 73. David Lewis (and, before that, Robert Stalnaker) came up with a framework for assigning a truth-value
- 74. David Lewis (1941-2001)
- 75. Take the following counterfactual: (l) “If kangaroos had no tails, they’d topple over.” How do we
- 76. more precisely... Bjerring’s formulation (2017, 330): (SL) A counterfactual of the form “If P, then Q”
- 77. So if the world at which kangaroos lack tails and topple over is closer to the
- 78. (m) “If I had struck this match, it would have lit.” Again, this will be true
- 79. antecedent strengthening I didn’t mention this above, but yet another problem with the material conditional and
- 80. antecedent strengthening If “A ? B” is true, then so too is “(A & C) ?
- 81. But natural languages don’t seem to work this way: (m) “If I had struck this match,
- 82. Fortunately, with SL we can say (m) is true and (n) is false. We’d analyze the
- 83. A similar story can be told about: (l) “If kangaroos had no tails, they’d topple over.”
- 84. some issues (1) How do we determine the “similarity” or “nearness” of worlds? (2) What are
- 85. some issues (1) How do we determine the “similarity” or “nearness” of worlds? (2) What are
- 86. Quine’s example (about Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War): (p) “If Caesar were in command, he
- 87. What world are we talking about: a world very much like ours (e.g., 1953), but Caesar
- 88. The “uniqueness assumption” was endorsed by Stalnaker but not Lewis. It says that, for each antecedent
- 89. again from Quine... (r) “If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian.”
- 90. some issues (1) How do we determine the “similarity” or “nearness” of worlds? (2) What are
- 91. some issues (1) How do we determine the “similarity” or “nearness” of worlds? (2) What are
- 92. some issues (1) How do we determine the “similarity” or “nearness” of worlds? (2) What are
- 93. squaring the circle To “square a circle” is to use only a compass and a ruler
- 94. (t) “If Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have been a famous mathematician. (u) “If
- 95. Because squaring the circle is mathematically impossible, and because possible worlds must obey the rules of
- 96. So how do we check to see whether these counterfactuals are true, given the Stalnaker and
- 97. Lewis (and others) thought counterpossibles are all vacuously true. A lot of people think this is
- 98. (t) “If Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have been a famous mathematician. (u) “If
- 99. So there are a number of people in philosophy who are trying to extend counterfactual semantics
- 100. conditionals and pretense
- 101. A lot of reasoning that we engage in occurs when we act “as if” something were
- 102. “How is it possible for a child to think of a banana as if it were
- 103. Effectively, Leslie is asking how counterfactual reasoning in possible in young children?
- 104. Consider Galileo... How would a ball roll down this inclined plane if there were no friction?
- 105. Or Newton... What would an object do were there no forces acting on the object at
- 106. Another contemporary topic in philosophy (and cognitive science) is whether scientific reasoning is just an outgrowth
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