Wildlife and Fisheries Resource Governance

Содержание

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5) Wildlife :-

a) Importance of wildlife :-
i) Wildlife helps to

5) Wildlife :- a) Importance of wildlife :- i) Wildlife helps to
preserve biodiversity.
ii) Wild life helps to maintain food chains and food web.
iii) We get useful products from wild life like food, medicines, leather,
bones, honey, lac etc.
b) Conservation of wildlife :-
i) Preserving the natural habitats of animals.
ii) Banning poaching of animals.
iii) Protecting endangered species of animals.
iv) Setting up of wildlife sanctuaries, national parks, biosphere
reserves etc.

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Contents

Utilization of common property resources
Fisheries and economic development
The simple sustainable fisheries model
Efficient

Contents Utilization of common property resources Fisheries and economic development The simple
fisheries
Unmanaged common property fisheries
Fisheries over time: Dynamics
Uncertainty in fisheries
Special fisheries: Schooling and migration
Multispecies fisheries

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Lecture 1 Utilization of Common Property Resources: Opportunities and limitations

The economic (and social)

Lecture 1 Utilization of Common Property Resources: Opportunities and limitations The economic
problem is to arrange production and consumption so as to maximize national economic welfare.
Opportunities for generating economic welfare are measured by the GDP (gross domestic production)
So, the economic governance problem is to find ways to maximize the GDP

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Ways to solve the economic problem

There are essentially three basic types of

Ways to solve the economic problem There are essentially three basic types
economic organizations to deal with the problem:
The traditional economy
The command economy
The market economy
The first two generally do not solve the problem!
The market system solves the economic problem under certain circumstances ('the invisible hand').
All goods traded in markets
Full information
Perfect competition

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The market system does not solve the economic problem in the case

The market system does not solve the economic problem in the case
of common property natural resources
Common property natural resources are ones that are not privately owned. Examples are:
the ozone layer,
common grazing lands,
many aquatic resources,
many water resources,
Common property resources are not tradable
⇒ No price, and markets don’t work

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Fish stocks are often (although not always) common property natural resources.

Fish stocks are often (although not always) common property natural resources. ⇒
The market system is not going to maximize their economic contribution to the nation.
⇒ It is necessary to resort to special fisheries management.
Why does the market system not work for common property natural resources?
The prisoners’ dilemma game!

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Simple fishing game (An example of the prisoners’ dilemma)

Two fishers
Options: fish full-out or

Simple fishing game (An example of the prisoners’ dilemma) Two fishers Options:
fish prudently

Best policy for both A & B is to fish full out !

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This (in essence) is
“The tragedy of common property resources”
(Hardin 1968)

People misuse natural

This (in essence) is “The tragedy of common property resources” (Hardin 1968)
resources because of lack of private of property rights

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Lecture 2 Fisheries and Economic Development

Fisheries can affect economic development in various ways.
Direct

Lecture 2 Fisheries and Economic Development Fisheries can affect economic development in
contribution to GDP
Forward and backward linkages (indirect contribution to GDP)
Source of economic profits that can be invested (economic growth impacts)
Source of government taxation income
Labour employment & training (creation of human capital)

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Direct contribution to GDP

Direct contribution = Profits + Supplemental wage

Wage above

Direct contribution to GDP Direct contribution = Profits + Supplemental wage Wage above the going rate!
the going rate!

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Linkages

Backward Linkages (economic surplus there?)
Inputs
Maintenance
Shipbuilding, gear ……..etc, etc.
Forward linkages (economic surplus there?)
Processing
Marketing
Transport…………etc.,

Linkages Backward Linkages (economic surplus there?) Inputs Maintenance Shipbuilding, gear ……..etc, etc.
etc.

==> Demand for labour

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Multiplier Effects

The linkages and profits generated in the fishing industry give rise

Multiplier Effects The linkages and profits generated in the fishing industry give
to multiplier effects in the economy.
These multiplier effects can expand the GDP far in excess of the direct impact of the fishing industry

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Types of multipliers

Links multipliers
The fishery expands (or contracts) other industries via linkages
Demand

Types of multipliers Links multipliers The fishery expands (or contracts) other industries
multipliers
Income generated in the fishery leads to demand for other goods and services
Investment multipliers
Income generated in the fisheries (esp. profits) may be invested and thus lead to economic growth

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Size of Multipliers

Multiplier effects in an underemployment economy will generally be larger

Size of Multipliers Multiplier effects in an underemployment economy will generally be
than in a full employment economy.
Multiplier effects in a vibrant economy will generally be larger than in a stagnant economy.
When fisheries are rationalized (from the common property point) there will be reduced demand for inputs
=> multiplier effects in developing a new fishery will generally be larger than when rationalizing an existing fishery

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Illustrative Examples
(Rationalizing (downsizing) an existing fishery)

Illustrative Examples (Rationalizing (downsizing) an existing fishery)

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Illustrative Examples
(Developing a new fishery)

Illustrative Examples (Developing a new fishery)

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Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth

Profits generated in the fishery can be

Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth Profits generated in the fishery can be
invested and thus launch the economy onto a new growth path
Simple model:
GDPt = a⋅Kt,
Kt = Kt-1 -d⋅Kt-1 +It,
It=I+profitst+s⋅GDP
Kt = capital at time t
It = investment at time t
I = fixed investment
a=output/capital ratio (a=0.33)
d = depreciation rate (d=0.1)
s=savings rate (s=0.05)

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Growth Model Impact of fisheries rents

+5.1%

+25.8%

Growth Model Impact of fisheries rents +5.1% +25.8%

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Fisheries contribution to GDP

Direct contribution is the foundation!
Without it there can be

Fisheries contribution to GDP Direct contribution is the foundation! Without it there
no multiplier or growth effects,
(.....unless generated by linkages).

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Other important considerations

Fisheries as a source of taxation revenue
Fisheries as a source

Other important considerations Fisheries as a source of taxation revenue Fisheries as
of foreign exchange
Fisheries as a source of
education,
know-how,
labour-training
entrepreneurship

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Lecture 3 The Simple Sustainable Fisheries Model

Here the simple aggregate fisheries model
Sufficient

Lecture 3 The Simple Sustainable Fisheries Model Here the simple aggregate fisheries
to understand the essentials of the fisheries problem

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The biomass growth function

Biomass

Biomass
growth

The biomass growth function Biomass Biomass growth

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The Harvesting Function

Harvest

Fishing effort

[Small stock]

[Large stock]

The Harvesting Function Harvest Fishing effort [Small stock] [Large stock]

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The Sustainable Yield (harvest)

The Sustainable Yield (harvest)

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The Sustainable Biomass

Sustainable
biomass

Fishing effort

The Sustainable Biomass Sustainable biomass Fishing effort

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Harvesting costs

Costs,
$

Fishing effort

Harvesting costs Costs, $ Fishing effort

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The Sustainable Fisheries Model

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Costs

Sustainable
revenues (yield)

Sustainable
biomass

Profits

The Sustainable Fisheries Model Value, $ Effort Biomass Costs Sustainable revenues (yield) Sustainable biomass Profits

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Lecture 4 Efficient Fisheries

Efficient fisheries are those that maximize contribution to social welfare
Must

Lecture 4 Efficient Fisheries Efficient fisheries are those that maximize contribution to
be Pareto efficient
⇒ maximize difference between revenues and costs
Same as maximizing profits, if prices are correct.
Distributional considerations may modify this – but be careful!.

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The Sustainable Fisheries Model

The Sustainable Fisheries Model

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Nota Bene

It is the OSY-point (optimal sustainable yield ) that is socially

Nota Bene It is the OSY-point (optimal sustainable yield ) that is
optimal
MSY is not socially optimal
OSY implies greater biomass than MSY
OSY is sustainable
OSY entails little risk of stock collapse
OSY generally generates substantial profits (rents)

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Changing parameters

Costs (e.g. price of fuel)
Output price
Biomass growth

Changing parameters Costs (e.g. price of fuel) Output price Biomass growth

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Lower costs

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Sustainable
biomass

MSY

OSY

Lower costs Value, $ Effort Biomass Sustainable biomass MSY OSY

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Lower prices

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Sustainable
biomass

MSY

OSY

Lower prices Value, $ Effort Biomass Sustainable biomass MSY OSY

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Lower biomass growth

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

?

Lower biomass growth Value, $ Effort Biomass ?

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Unprofitable Fishery

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Costs

Sustainable
revenues (yield)

Sustainable
biomass

MSY

OSY

Unprofitable Fishery Value, $ Effort Biomass Costs Sustainable revenues (yield) Sustainable biomass MSY OSY

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Lecture 5 Unmanaged Common Property Fisheries (Sometimes called the competitive fishery)

Fishing effort converges to

Lecture 5 Unmanaged Common Property Fisheries (Sometimes called the competitive fishery) Fishing
a point where there are
No profits (⇒ poor fishermen)
Biomass is low (below OSY-level)
There is an increased and often substantial risk of a stock collapse
Harvests are often less than at the OSY

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Unmanaged common property fisheries

Unmanaged common property fisheries

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Common property fisheries and technical progress

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Sustainable
biomass

OSY

CSY

MSY

Common property fisheries and technical progress Value, $ Effort Biomass Sustainable biomass OSY CSY MSY

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Nota bene

The same applies to price increases, cost reductions, subsidies etc.
There are

Nota bene The same applies to price increases, cost reductions, subsidies etc.
no long term benefits, but an increased risk of a stock collapse, i.e. Less sustainability
Isn´t this in accordance with history?

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The fundamental source of the problem

Prisoners’ dilemma
Lack of private property rights (the

The fundamental source of the problem Prisoners’ dilemma Lack of private property
wrong institutional structure)
Externalities
It is not!
Lack of understanding by fishermen
Mistakes by fishermen

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The common property problem is

Universal
It is found all over the world in

The common property problem is Universal It is found all over the
all sorts of situations
All common property fisheries exhibit these features
There are no counterexamples
Claimed counterexamples are rare
They turn out to be some sort of management structures that alleviate the CPP
Even so they are generally just slightly better than the competitive equilibrium
One of the most solid laws of all of economics

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Is there anything good about common property fisheries?

People have mentioned:
Increased (maximum) employment
More

Is there anything good about common property fisheries? People have mentioned: Increased
equitable
Politically feasible
But does this really hold water?

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Lecture 6 Fisheries over Time: Dynamics

Real fisheries evolve over time
They may take a

Lecture 6 Fisheries over Time: Dynamics Real fisheries evolve over time They
long time to reach an equilibrium (constant or sustainable state)
As a result, equilibrium models constitute a very limited description of real fisheries. (At best they describe a long term tendency)
Therefore, we need dynamic models

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The evolution of fisheries over time is a complicated and technically demanding

The evolution of fisheries over time is a complicated and technically demanding
subject
A convenient analytical tool is provided by“phase diagrams in biomass-effort space”
That consists of:
Biomass equilibrium curves
Effort equilibrium curves
Derivation of the joint movement of biomass and effort over time

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A theoretical example:

Dynamic Fisheries I (The common property case)

A theoretical example: Dynamic Fisheries I (The common property case)

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Fisheries Dynamics:
(The common property or competitive case)

Fisheries Dynamics: (The common property or competitive case)

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Note
The economic equilibrium curve ( ) corresponds to zero profits
The competitive equilibrium

Note The economic equilibrium curve ( ) corresponds to zero profits The
corresponds to zero profits
Note, the danger of stock extinction
In equilibrium
Along the adjustment path
Note the impact of
Increased fish price
Cost changes
Technological advances
Subsidies

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Technological Advance

Technological Advance

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Dynamic Fisheries II (The optimal case)

It is not possible to jump immediately to

Dynamic Fisheries II (The optimal case) It is not possible to jump
the long run optimal equilibrium
Moreover, due to varying biological, economic and environmental conditions, it is not possible in reality to stay at the optimal equilibrium
Therefore, the task is always to select the optimal adjustment path to the optimal equilibrium

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Examples Adjustment Paths

Examples Adjustment Paths

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Economically, it is very important to find and implement the optimal adjustment

Economically, it is very important to find and implement the optimal adjustment
path - at least approximately
Theoretically, optimal paths should look something like this:

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Example Optimal Fisheries Policy

Example Optimal Fisheries Policy

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In optimal dynamics, the rate of discount (interest) plays an important role
The

In optimal dynamics, the rate of discount (interest) plays an important role
higher the rate of discount, the lower the optimal equilibrium biomass
If the rate of discount is high enough, the optimal equilibrium may exceed the MSY- effort level.
The reason is that current benefits become relatively more attractive than future ones

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Optimal sustainable biomass and the rate of discount (interest)

Optimal sustainable biomass and the rate of discount (interest)

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Lecture 7 Uncertainty in Fisheries

Fisheries are subject to a great deal of uncertainty
Therefore

Lecture 7 Uncertainty in Fisheries Fisheries are subject to a great deal
the outcome of a fisheries management policy is always uncertain
Therefore, even a conservative policy may lead to a stock collapse
Therefore, even a reckless policy may not lead to detrimental consequences

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Sources of uncertainty

Lack of knowledge
Model (parameters & relationships) (Estimation problems)
State of the

Sources of uncertainty Lack of knowledge Model (parameters & relationships) (Estimation problems)
system (Measurement problems)
Levels of control variables (Measurement and control problems)
Fundamental randomness in nature
Recruitment
Feed availability
Environmental conditions
Economic conditions

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Implications of uncertainty

The outcomes of a given fishery policy are subject to

Implications of uncertainty The outcomes of a given fishery policy are subject
risk
I.e. may turn out differently than expected
Equilibrium will never be maintained
Random shocks will always disturb the system

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Appropriate responses

Apply optimal decision making under risk
Maximize the expected value of any

Appropriate responses Apply optimal decision making under risk Maximize the expected value
action
Risk amounts to a cost (if risk averse)
Therefore the optimal course is to avoid undue risk
This suggests
Less risky fisheries policy
I.e. normally lower exploitation levels (less catches, higher biomass)

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The effects of risk

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

OSY
(no risk)

OSY

Risk “cost”

Effort: reduced
Biomass: increased

The effects of risk Value, $ Effort Biomass OSY (no risk) OSY

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Lecture 8 Special Fisheries

Two topics
Schooling species
Migratory fish stocks

Lecture 8 Special Fisheries Two topics Schooling species Migratory fish stocks

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I. Schooling species

Defining characteristic: Stock size does not affect harvesting
This holds primarily

I. Schooling species Defining characteristic: Stock size does not affect harvesting This
for pelagic species
This implies:
Catch per unit effort, CPUE, is not a measure of stock size
Serious danger of extinction, especially under competitive fishing

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Schooling species: Sustainable yield

Sustainable
yield

Fishing effort

Schooling species: Sustainable yield Sustainable yield Fishing effort

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Schooling Species: The sustainable fisheries model

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Costs

Sustainable
revenues (yield)

Sustainable
biomass

MSY

OSY

Schooling Species: The sustainable fisheries model Value, $ Effort Biomass Costs Sustainable

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Schooling Species: Extinction under competition

Value,
$

Effort

Biomass

Costs

Sustainable
revenues (yield)

Sustainable
biomass

MSY

OSY

Schooling Species: Extinction under competition Value, $ Effort Biomass Costs Sustainable revenues

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II. Migratory fish stocks

Defining characteristic: Distance from port varies over time
It follows

II. Migratory fish stocks Defining characteristic: Distance from port varies over time
that:
The economics of harvesting vary over time
The optimal fisheries policy varies over time
Similar impact from other varying conditions including:
Catchability
Weather
Prices etc.

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Migrations: An example

Country

Fish stock migrations

Migrations: An example Country Fish stock migrations

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The economics of harvesting

The economics of harvesting

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Optimal Harvesting Periods

Time

Potential profits, $

Fishing period 1

Fishing period 2

Optimal Harvesting Periods Time Potential profits, $ Fishing period 1 Fishing period 2

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Multi-national utilization of a migratory stock

Marked tendency to evolve as a common property,

Multi-national utilization of a migratory stock Marked tendency to evolve as a
unmanaged fishery
Excessive fishing effort and capital
Loss of economic rents
Low biomass
Risk of extinction
However, there is generally room for mutually advantageous agreements

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Two country migratory fishery

Country A

Fish stock migrations

Country B

EEZ for B

EEZ for A

Two country migratory fishery Country A Fish stock migrations Country B EEZ

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Lecture 9 Multispecies Fisheries

All fish stocks are embedded in an ecological system (ecosystem)
The

Lecture 9 Multispecies Fisheries All fish stocks are embedded in an ecological
ecosystem generally contains a number of different species
These species interact in a variety of ways
Predation
Competition
Symbiosis

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Ecological interactions lead to complications
Multiple equilibria
Strange dynamics
Chaos
Even when there are no

Ecological interactions lead to complications Multiple equilibria Strange dynamics Chaos Even when
ecological interactions, the economics of multi-species fisheries can lead to equally complicated dynamics
Multi-species relationships may affect
Stocks
Harvests
Costs
Profits

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Example of chaos

Two species
Predator and prey
Consider biomass path of prey
Two cases:
No harvesting

Example of chaos Two species Predator and prey Consider biomass path of
of predator
Heavy harvesting of predator

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Biomass path of prey No harvesting of predator

Biomass path of prey No harvesting of predator

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Biomass path of prey Harvesting of predator

Biomass path of prey Harvesting of predator

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Appropriate responses

Sensible fisheries policy/management must take account of multi-species relationships
Under multi-species conditions,

Appropriate responses Sensible fisheries policy/management must take account of multi-species relationships Under
optimal fishing effort on one species will depend on the fishing effort for all the other species
It follows that the different fishing efforts must be set simultaneously

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Sustainable yield for one species in a multi-species context

Fishing effort

Sustainable
yield

High effort for

Sustainable yield for one species in a multi-species context Fishing effort Sustainable
other species

Low effort for other species

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2-species sustainable yield contours

Species 1

Species 2

2-species sustainable yield contours Species 1 Species 2

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An Example: Icelandic cod & capelin

Cod prays on capelin
Cod is much more

An Example: Icelandic cod & capelin Cod prays on capelin Cod is much more valuable
valuable

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Sustainable yields

Cod
Blue dots: Maximum capelin stock
Red line: Average capelin stock
Green dash: A

Sustainable yields Cod Blue dots: Maximum capelin stock Red line: Average capelin
very small capelin stock

Capelin:
Green dash: A very small cod stock
Red line: Average cod stock
Blue dots: Large cod stock

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Icelandic cod and capelin: Optimal joint harvesting paths

Only
cod fishing

Only
capelin
fishing

No
fishing

Cod
and capelin

Icelandic cod and capelin: Optimal joint harvesting paths Only cod fishing Only

fishing

Stock of capelin

Stock of cod

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Ecosystem fisheries

A special case of multispecies fisheries
Several species
Jointly caught
Selectivity impossible
Harvesting

Ecosystem fisheries A special case of multispecies fisheries Several species Jointly caught
takes a proportion of all biomasses
May be characteristic of many tropical fisheries
But is it really true?
Fishing technology
Fishing techniques

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Implications

Some species may be wiped out before ecosystem extraction is optimized
This leads

Implications Some species may be wiped out before ecosystem extraction is optimized
to problems of irreversibilities
The high value of depleted (extinct) species
But is it really extinct?
This also leads to technical problems of analysis
Nonconvexities

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3 Species Sustainable biomass

Aggregate

Species 3

Species 2

Species 1

3 Species Sustainable biomass Aggregate Species 3 Species 2 Species 1

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3 Species Sustainable yield

Aggregate

Species 3

Species 2

Species 1

3 Species Sustainable yield Aggregate Species 3 Species 2 Species 1

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What to do?

Regard as one joint biomass?
Likelihood of wiping out species.
Much

What to do? Regard as one joint biomass? Likelihood of wiping out
reduced for optimal fishing
Cost of wiping out. How costly is it?
If very costly, cannot exploit ecosystem

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Possible situation

Costs

Revenues

Possible situation Costs Revenues

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What to do?

Avoid extinction by
Marine reserves and possibly rotational harvesting
Marine reserves (conservatories)

What to do? Avoid extinction by Marine reserves and possibly rotational harvesting
and re-introductions
Develop selective fishing technology
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