Module 1 - Security Threat Landscape_0617

After completing this learning unit, you will have an understanding of:
The impact security has, the evolution of attacks and the anatomy of an attack
How credentials and privileged access can be protected
How to protect applications and data in any cloud
How to protect the virtualization fabric
How to protect with “just enough” OS
Objectives

Lesson 1: Security, attacks and threats
Introduction
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Basics
Help protect credentials
and privileged access
Help protect applications and data in any cloud
Help protect the virtualization fabric
Protect with just enough OS
Windows Server 2016 security summary
Lessons

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 1: Security, attacks and threats
Section: Introduction

Increasing
incidents
Multiple
motivations
Bigger risk
Security is a Top Priority for IT

Evolution of Attacks

Source: McKinsey, Ponemon Institute, Verizon
“Cyber security is a CEO issue.”
-McKinsey

Corporate secrets are public knowledge; potential loss of competitive advantage

Different Attack Vectors

Attack Timeline
24–48 hours
Mean dwell time 150+ days
(varies by industry)
First host compromised
Domain admin compromised
Attack discovered
Attacker undetected
(data exfiltration)
Research & preparation

Malicious Attachment Execution
Browser or Doc Exploit Execution
Stolen Credential Use
Internet Service Compromise
Kernel-mode Malware
Kernel Exploits
Pass-the-Hash
Malicious Attachment Delivery
Browser or Doc Exploit Delivery
Phishing Attacks
ESPIONAGE, LOSS OF IP
DATA THEFT
RANSOM
LOST PRODUCTIVITY
BUSINESS DISRUPTION
Enter
Establish
Expand
Endgame
Anatomy of an Attack

Example Attack Scenario
Domain controllers
Directory
database(s)
Persist presence

Schoolboard
50 Employees
300 Students
Public funds
Construction
4,000 Employees
$30 millions YR
Private funds
Energy
95,000 Employees
$5 billions YR
Private funds
Shareholders

Schoolboard, from the Attacker’s Perspective
June the 3rd
Email sent to
[e-mail]
with a PPTX attached
June the 3rd + 2 minutes
At least 5 members of
the helpdesk opened the
attachment
June the 3rd + 5 minutes
2 machines start beaconing

Schoolboard, from the Attacker’s Perspective
June the 3rd + 6 minutes
The malware is extracting
credentials and sends them
to its C2 server
June the 3rd + 15 minutes
The attacker is dumping emails
from the helpdesk users.
June the 4th
The attacker found an email
about the new payroll application
crashing on server PAY01.

Schoolboard, from the Attacker’s Perspective
June the 4th
The attacker takes remote
control of one of the sleeping
helpdesk computers and then accesses
to PAY01
June the 4th
The helpdesk user is an
Administrator of the payroll application and more (Domain Admins member)
June the 4th
The attacker downloads the public
documentation of the payroll
application
July the 1st
The attacker creates fake employees
in the payroll system and assigns
them foreign bank accounts

Schoolboard, from the Attacker’s Perspective
August the 1st
The attacker fires its fake employees
and delete the transaction logs
$140 K
Money embezzlement
½ of the yearly budget of the schoolboard
Tax payers’ money

Schoolboard, from the Other Side
June the 4th
One helpdesk user reports
receiving spam to its IT admin
June the 15th
The IT admin scans the machine
of the user and doesn’t find
anything
June the 30th
Vacation time ?

Schoolboard, from the Other Side
August the 15th
The bank calls the accountant to
inform him of the recent unusual
summer activities
August the 16th
The accountant listens to his voicemail
and realizes that the budget is wrong
August the 31st
Press release
81%
In 81% of breaches, the affected organization did not detect the breach themselves but were notified by others.

Spam/phishing detection
Phishing awareness training
Suspicious activities reporting process (Security Incident Management)
No separation of privileged accounts
Helpdesk accounts have too many privileges
What went wrong?

Construction
4,000 Employees
$30 millions YR
Private funds

Construction, from the Attacker’s Perspective
January the 3rd
A mobile server room
disappears from a construction
site
January the 5th
Most of the hardware is sold
A domain controller is identified
January the 6th
The NTDS.DIT database is cracked.
A majority of the passwords are discovered
Planning a targeted attack
This includes the passwords of privileged accounts
January the 7th
Review of the other stolen
data, identified webmail and
VPN endpoints

Construction, from the Attacker’s Perspective
January the 10th
VPN connection made
on behalf of
CONSTRUCTION\Joe
January the 10th
From Joe’s session, runas as
Administrator and discovery of
all connected assets
January the 10th to February the 15th
Extract all targeted data
Implement a shutdown script via GPO
to extract credentials of the connected
users and send them to a remote server
February the 16th
All assets are now a member
of a botnet. Machines are waiting
for instructions

Construction, from the Attacker’s Perspective
March the 1st
Some identities are sold
The attacker prepares the field for
a ransomware drop
March the 2nd
VSS is stopped on a majority
of servers and backup software
Is configured to backup only OS
April the 1st
D-day for Ransomware activation
Use GPO to deploy the payload on
every AD joined machine
April the 2nd
All enterprise data is encrypted

Construction, from the Attacker’s Perspective
April the 14th
After 12 days of work without
IT data, and because the most of
the backups are too old, most of the
ransoms are paid
$220K ransom
Some old data has been restored
The attacker is still present on the network
$2M business impact
Lost work / Cannot respond to offers

Construction, from the Other Side
January the 6th
A construction site is back to
work after the holiday break
Servers and laptops are reported
stolen
January the 7th
The IT admins are not too worried as the
file server has not a lot of data and laptops
were old
January the 12th
New hardware is shipped
Security is reinforced
CCTV is implemented
Security guards patrol more often

Construction, from the Other Side
March the 15th
DBA are complaining about
backups failing
March the 22th
The backup team is performing manual
backups of critical servers in the meantime
this got resolved
April the 2nd
Users cannot access their personal
data nor their corporate (server hosted)
data
~200 days
Most of attacks go undetected for around a year (on average), leaving organizations vulnerable to ongoing loss and damage.

Physical protection
Procedures in case of theft
Inefficient monitoring
What went wrong?

Energy
95,000 Employees
$5 billions YR
Private funds
Shareholders
Networks
Corporate network
Closed network in
production sites

Energy, from the Attacker’s Perspective
March the 3rd
The attacker got a valid
account from a previous
hack
March the 5th
Lateral movemenent to more than 50 machines
Harvest new set of credentials
March the 7th
Drop new malware
It exploits a vulnerability patched
last month

Energy, from the Attacker’s Perspective
April the 5th
Giga bytes of data
are extracted
The attacker gets intel about
the ID used in the closed network
April the 30th
The attacker is installing its own
VMs and deploy a Kali
May the 1st
The attacker is creating service accounts
member of the Backup Operators group
May the 5th
Drop custom USB flash drives
with embedded cred around
the production staff

Energy, from the Attacker’s Perspective
May the 7th
The production is down
in one critical site
May the 8th
Ransomware are deployed in
Corp and production networks
$12k ransom
Some old data has been restored
The attacker is still present on the network
$35M fines
Failed to comply to security regulations
$90M loss market share
Stock is going down

Energy, from the Other Side
April the 4th
AV team clean up malwares found
on several workstations
(systems are formatted)
May the 6th
Network team detect abnormal
network activities. Delete suspicious VM
and change passwords of VM admins
May the 7th
Major production outage
Production site down, no ETA

Energy, from the Other Side
May the 8th
Ransomware on many systems
June the 1st
The company announce the new to the shareholder
Net losses
June the 2nd
Press release

More than 200 days (varies by industry)
Typical Attack Timeline & Observations
Attack Sophistication
Attack operators exploit any weakness
Target information on any device or service
Target AD & Identities
Active Directory controls access to business assets
Attackers commonly target AD and IT Admins
Attacks not detected
Current detection tools miss most attacks
You may be under attack (or compromised)
Response and Recovery
Response requires advanced expertise and tools
Expensive and challenging to successfully recover
24-48 Hours

Cost of an attack
The cost of these attacks to the global economy, and to an individual company, is significant. It is estimated that the total potential cost of cybercrime to the global economy is $500 billion. The average cost of a data breach to a company is estimated at $3.5 million. However, the cumulative impact as a result from damage to brand reputation, loss of confidential data, and intellectual property is just as, if not more, damaging.
(Source: CSIS-McAfee Report)
(Source: Ponemon Institute releases 2014 Cost of Data Breach)

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Basics

Hard Lessons…

Windows Server Security Posture

Secure the OS
Managed privileged identities
Secure virtualization
What do we need to secure and how?

Fundamentals of Information Security

Information Security Concepts and Fundamental Principles
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
The CIA Triad

The three pillars
Fundamentals of Information Security

References for Canada
• Annex 1 - Departmental IT Security Risk Management Activities: IT Security Risk Management: A Lifecycle Approach ( mentioned all over the place in that order here)
https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/265/html/24453
• Overview: IT Security Risk Management: A Lifecycle Approach
https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/265/html/22814
• IT Security Risk Management: A Lifecycle Approach
https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/publication/itsg-33
HIDDEN – More Information

Constraints
Fundamentals of Information Security

You want to make it…
Harder
Longer
More noisy
… for the attacker
You want to be an unattractive target
Defense-in-Depth Modeling

Defense-in-Depth Modeling
Layers of Defense:
When talking about the various layers to protect, we want to consider a variety of attack vectors. Take a moment to review each layer as presented in the picture on the right. Consider where your organization might be vulnerable.
During this class, we will be discussing various ways you can harden your Microsoft infrastructure. However, you should always think about how the concepts we present here can be applied elsewhere within your environment.
Physical Security
Perimeter
Internal Network
Host
Application
Data
ACLs, encryption, Rights management
Application design, antivirus
Operating system hardening, authentication, patch management, HIDS
Network segments, IPsec, NIDS
Firewalls, Network Access Quarantine Control, NAP
Guards, locks, tracking devices
Security documents, user education
People, Policies, Process

Strategic shift
Defense-in-Depth Modeling
From perimeter security …
… to assumed breach
Protect information
Establish security practices
Manage threats
Respond strongly

Risk Management

What is a vulnerability?
A flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management.
What is a risk?
The probability of a vulnerability being exploited in the current environment, leading to a degree of loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, of an asset
Key Concepts

Basic Security Principles
Security decisions are risk management decisions
Risk can never be reduced to zero
Prioritization and focus becomes important
Assess Risk
Identify and prioritize risks to the business
Conduct Decision Support
Identify and evaluate control solutions based on a defined cost-benefit analysis process
Implement Controls
Deploy and operate control solutions to reduce risk to the business.
Measure Effectiveness
Analyze the risk management process for effectiveness
Verify that controls are providing the expected degree of protection

Basic Security Principles:
How We Protect It
Principle of Least Privilege (POLP)
Access varies based on minimum amount of privilege for the requirement
Access allowed only for required duration
Reduce the Attack Surface
Lower attack surface directly reduces the probability of a successful attack
Security Zones
Objects with similar security requirements are grouped
Similar security is then applied to the whole group
Role-Based Security
Security applied based on job or task requirements
Based on the Principle of Least Privilege

The 10 Immutable Laws of Security Administration:
Nobody believes that anything bad can happen to them, until it does
Security only works if the secure way also happens to be the easy way
If you do not keep up with security fixes, your network will not be yours for long
It does not do much good to install security fixes on a computer that was never secured to begin with.
Eternal vigilance is the price of security
There is really someone out there trying to guess your passwords
The most secure network is a well-administered one
The difficulty of defending a network is directly proportional to its complexity
Security is not about risk avoidance; it is about risk management
Technology is not a panacea
10 Immutable Laws of Security Administration: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc722488.aspx

The 10 Immutable Laws of Security Administration:
If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it's not solely your computer anymore.
If a bad guy can alter the operating system on your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
If you allow a bad guy to run active content in your website, it's not your website any more.
Weak passwords trump strong security.
A computer is only as secure as the administrator is trustworthy.
Encrypted data is only as secure as its decryption key.
An out-of-date antimalware scanner is only marginally better than no scanner at all.
Absolute anonymity isn't practically achievable, online or offline.
Technology is not a panacea.

Sample AD assets
Domain Controllers
Active Directory Backups
Administrative Accounts and Groups
Identities and attributes
Group Policies
Administrative Workstations
Administrative Delegations
Administration Team

Vulnerabilities
A flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy
Examples:
Physical
Unlocked doors
Unguarded access to computing facilities
Insufficient fire suppression systems
Natural
Facility located on a fault line
Facility located in a flood zone
Facility located in an avalanche area

Vulnerabilities (continued)
Hardware
Outdated firmware
Systems not physically secured
Misconfigured systems
Software
Out-of-date antivirus software
Missing patches
Poorly written applications

Vulnerabilities (continued)
Communications
Unencrypted network protocols
Connections to multiple networks
No filtering between network segments
Human
Poorly defined procedures
Stolen credentials
Media
Electrical interference

Vulnerabilities (continued)
Poorly written or secured scripts
Weak admin accounts security
Poorly secured AD objects
Unnecessary software and services installed on domain controllers
Lack of Security Audit and Monitoring

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Help protect credentials
and privileged access

Challenges in Protecting Credentials
Ben
Mary
Jake
Admin
Domain admin
Typical administrator
Capability
Time
Social engineering leads
to credential theft
Most attacks involve gathering credentials (Pass-the-Hash attacks)
Administrative credentials typically provide unnecessary extra rights for unlimited time

Helping Protect Privileged Credentials
Ben
Mary
Jake
Admin
Domain admin
JEA and JIT administration
Capability
Time
Just Enough Administration (JEA) limits administrative privileges to the bare-minimum required set of actions (limited in space)
Just in Time Administration (JIT) provides privileged access upon request through a workflow that is audited and limited in time

Helping Protect Privileged Credentials
Ben
Mary
Jake
Admin
Domain admin
JEA and JIT administration
Capability
Time
Just Enough Administration (JEA) limits administrative privileges to the bare-minimum required set of actions (limited in space)
Just in Time Administration (JIT) provides privileged access upon request through a workflow that is audited and limited in time
Credential Guard prevents Pass the Hash and Pass the Ticket attacks by protecting stored credentials and credential artifacts using Virtualization based Security (VBS)

Helping Protect Privileged Credentials
Ben
Mary
Jake
Admin
Domain admin
JEA and JIT administration
Capability
Time
Just Enough Administration (JEA) limits administrative privileges to the bare-minimum required set of actions (limited in space)
Just in Time Administration (JIT) provides privileged access upon request through a workflow that is audited and limited in time
Credential Guard prevents Pass the Hash and Pass the Ticket attacks by protecting stored credentials and credential artifacts using Virtualization based Security (VBS)
Remote Credential Guard works in conjunction with Credential Guard for RDP sessions providing SSO over RDP while eliminating the need for credentials to be passed to the host

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Help protect applications and data in any cloud

Challenges Protecting the OS and Applications
New exploits can attack the OS
boot-path all the way up through applications operations
Known and unknown threats need to be blocked without impacting legitimate workloads
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems are only as intelligent as the information provided from the OS

Helping Protect OS and Applications
Device Guard
Ensure that only permitted binaries can be executed from the moment the OS is booted.
Windows Defender
Actively protects from known malware without impacting workloads.
Control Flow Guard
Protects against unknown vulnerabilities
by helping prevent memory corruption attacks.
Enhanced Logs
Log new audit events to better detect malicious behavior by providing more detailed information to security operation centers

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Help protect the virtualization fabric

Help Protect the Virtualization Fabric

Challenges Protecting Virtual Machines
Any compromised or malicious fabric administrators can access guest virtual machines.
Health of hosts not taken into account before running VMs.
Tenant’s VMs are exposed to storage and network attacks.
Virtual machines can’t
take advantage of hardware-
rooted security capabilities such as TPMs.

Helping Protect Virtual Machines
Shielded Virtual Machines
Use BitLocker to encrypt the disk and state
of virtual machines protecting secrets from compromised admins and malware.
Host Guardian Service
Attests to host health releasing the keys required to boot or migrate a Shielded
VM only to healthy hosts.
Generation 2 VMs
Supports virtualized equivalents of
hardware security technologies (e.g., TPMs) enabling BitLocker encryption for Shielded Virtual Machines.
`

Decryption keys: controlled by external system
HYPER-V HOST 1
+ KEY PROTECTION
+ HEALTH ATTESTATION
HOST GUARDIAN
SERVICE (HGS)
WINDOWS SERVER 2016
HYPER-V HOSTS
GUARDED FABRIC
HYPER-V HOST 2
HYPER-V HOST 3
Why certainly,
I know you & I must say you’re looking very healthy today!
Virtual Secure Mode
Virtual Secure Mode
Virtual Secure Mode
Hello, I’m HOST1, can I have some keys, please?

Decryption keys: controlled by external system
HYPER-V HOST 1
+ KEY PROTECTION
+ HEALTH ATTESTATION
HOST GUARDIAN
SERVICE (HGS)
GUARDED FABRIC
HYPER-V HOST 2
HYPER-V HOST 3
Sure, your certificate of health authorizes me to release keys to you for 8 hours
Virtual Secure Mode
Virtual Secure Mode
Virtual Secure Mode
OK, so I’m healthy then! Can I have the keys now?
WINDOWS SERVER 2016
HYPER-V HOSTS

Philip Moss
Chief Product Officer
Acuutech
Shielded Virtual Machines remove a hosting obstacle and are a huge competitive differentiator. No one but Microsoft has this technology now.
“
“

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Protect
with just
enough OS

Challenges in Protecting New Apps
Developers are protecting by making use of packaging and deployment tools such as containers.
Containers share the same kernel which limits isolation and exposes compliance and regulatory risks.
Reduce the risk by providing only the components required by application to run.

Windows Server 2016 Approach
Hyper-V containers
Provide hypervisor isolation for
each container with no additional coding requirements.
Helps align with regulatory requirements for PCI and PII data.
Nano Server
Reduce the attack surface by deploying a minimal “just enough” server footprint.

Security Threat Landscape
Lesson 2: Securing the environment
Section: Windows Server 2016 security summary

Windows Server 2016 Security Summary


DO NOT REMOVE: this is a hidden slide for notes purposes

Question #1: What is the new security perimeter?
Question #2: What are the four option we discussed that are used to protect against credential theft?
Question #3: Why is a shielded-VM more secure then a regular VM?
Knowledge Check